An integrated monopoly, where two complements forming a composite good are oered by a single rm, is typically welfare superior to a complementary monopoly. This is the tragedy of the anticommons. We analyze the robustness of such result when competition is introduced for one or both complements. Particularly, competition in only one of the two markets may be welfare superior to an integrated monopoly if and only if the substitutes dier in their quality so that, as their number increases, average quality and/or quality variance increases. Then, absent an adequate level of product dierentiation, favoring competition in some sectors while leaving monopolies in others may be detrimental for consumers and producers alike. Instead, competition in both markets may be welfare superior if goods are close substitutes and their number in each market is suciently high, no matter the degree of product dierentiation.
Introduction
A complementary monopoly is characterized by the presence of multiple sellers, each producing a complementary good. It has been known for quite some time in the literature that such market structure is worse than an integrated monopoly, in which a single rm oers all complements (Cournot, 1838) . In fact, a rm producing a single good takes into account only the impact of a price raise on its own prots, without considering the negative externality imposed on the sellers of other complementary goods 1 . As a consequence, prices will be higher with separate producers than with an integrated monopolist, generating a lower consumer surplus.
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The complementary monopoly problem is also known as the tragedy of the anticommons, in analogy with its mirror case, the more famous tragedy of the commons and has been applied in the legal literature to issues related to the fragmentation of physical and intellectual property rights.
3 Strictly speaking, such literature is applicable only to situations in which the markets for all complementary goods are monopolies. However, pure monopolies are quite rare in the real world. More often, each complement is produced in an oligopolistic setting. Consider, for instance, software markets, where each component of a system is produced by many competing rms, such as Microsoft, Apple, Unix and Linux for operating systems; Microsoft, Google, Apple, Mozilla for Internet browsers, and so on. Similarly, consider the market for photographic equipment, in which both camera bodies and lenses are produced by many competing companies (Nikon, Canon, Olympus, Pentax, etc.), some of which are active only in the market for lenses (Tamron, Sigma, Vivitar). In such cases, an integrated market structure may reduce the extent of the tragedy on the one hand, while lowering welfare because of reduced competition on the other.
The case of software markets is particularly relevant in this respect. In the last ten years, some important antitrust cases, both in the United States and in Europe, have brought to the attention of the economics profession the potential tradeo between competition and the tragedy of the anticommons. For instance, in the Microsoft case, the American Court of Appeals ordered the rm to divest branches of its business other than operating systems, creating a new company dedicated to application development. The break-up (later abandoned) would have created two rms producing complementary goods, with the likely result of increasing prices in the market.
However, far from being unaware of the potential tragedy of the anticommons, Judge Jackson motivated his decision with the need to reduce the possibility for Microsoft to engage in limit pricing, thus deterring entry. Separation would have facilitated entry and favoured competition, possibly driving prices below pre-separation levels. 4 A similar economic argument motivated 1 The quantity demanded would be reduced for everyone, but each seller benets fully of an increase in its own price.
2 Complementary monopoly is similar to the problem of double marginalization in bilateral monopoly, with the important dierence that here each monopolist competes side by side, possibly without direct contacts with the others. In bilateral monopoly, the upstream monopolist produces an input that will be used by the downstream rm, who is then a monopsonist for that specic input (see Machlup and Taber, 1960) .
the European Commission's Decision over the merger between General Electric and Honeywell.
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In such case, the EC indicated that the post-merger prices would be so low as to injure new entrants, so that a merger would reduce the number of potential and actual competitors in both markets.
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Both these decisions indicate that separation may not be an issue (and may even be welfare improving) if the post-separation market conguration is not a complementary monopoly in the Cournot's sense, i.e., the market for each complement is characterized by competition. The initially higher prices due to the tragedy may in fact encourage entry in the market and, if competition increases suciently, the resulting market structure may yield lower prices and higher welfare than in the initial integrated monopoly. The question then is how much competition is needed in the supply of each complement in order to obtain at least the same welfare as in the original monopoly.
Investigating the impact of competition on welfare when complementary goods are involved, Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2007) note that, when n perfect complements are bought together by consumers and rms compete à la Bertrand, two perfect substitutes for n − 1 complements are sucient to guarantee the same social welfare experienced when an integrated monopolist sells all n complements. In fact, all competitors in the n − 1 markets price at marginal cost, thus allowing the monopolist in the n-th market to extract the whole surplus, xing its price equal to the one that would be set by an integrated monopolist for the composite good. Therefore, the negative externality characterizing a complementary monopoly disappears and the tragedy of the anticommons is solved by competition.
Our analysis maintains this framework when it considers perfect complements but then extends it in several directions. First, dierently from previous literature, the competing goods are both imperfect substitutes 7 and vertically dierentiated. Second, we consider the presence of substitutes in all components' markets.
Particularly, we consider two perfect complements, proving rst that, if one complementary good is still produced in a monopolistic setting and if competition for the other complement does not alter the average quality in the market, an integrated monopoly remains welfare superior to more competitive market settings. In fact, with imperfect substitutability the competing rms retain enough market power as to price above their marginal cost, so that the monopolist in the rst market is not able to fully extract the surplus enjoyed by consumers. As a result, the equilibrium prices of the composite goods remain higher than in an integrated monopoly, implying that favoring competition in some sectors while leaving monopolies in others may actually be detrimental for consumers. A competitive setting may still be welfare superior, but only if the substitutes of the complementary good dier in their quality, so that average quality and/or quality variance increase as their number increases. 6 On the possibility that an integrated monopolist engages in limit pricing to deter entry, see Fudenberg and Tirole (2000).
7 Imperfect substitutability in this case means that the cross-price elasticity is lower than own-price elasticity.
Results change when competition is introduced in the supply of both components. In this case we nd that the tragedy may be solved for a relatively small number of competing rms in each sector provided that goods are suciently close substitutes. Not surprisingly, the higher the degree of substitutability and the number of competitors in one sector, the more concentrated the remaining sector can be and still yield a higher consumer surplus.
The welfare loss attached to a complementary monopoly has been analyzed, among others, by Economides and Salop (1992) , who present a generalized version of the Cournot complementary monopoly in a duopolistic setting. Dierently from our contribution, however, their model does not consider quality dierentiation, so that the tragedy always prevails whenever goods are not close substitutes. Moreover, they don't study if and how the tragedy can be solved when the number of substitutes for each complement increases.
8 McHardy (2006) demonstrates that breaking up producing complementary goods may lead to substantial welfare losses. However, if the break-up stops limit-pricing practices by the previously merged rm, even a relatively modest degree of post-separation entry may lead to higher welfare than an integrated monopoly. He assumes a setting in which rms producing the same component compete à la Cournot, whereas competition is à la Bertrand among complements (i.e., among sectors). Dierently from McHardy (2006), we analyze the impact of complementarities and entry in a model in which all rms compete both intra and inter layer and in such framework we also study the impact of product dierentiation and imperfect substitutability.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model when one sector is a monopoly and presents the benchmark cases of complementary and integrated monopoly. Section 3 analyzes the impact of competition on welfare when one complement is produced by a monopolist while Section 4 extends the model considering competition in the markets for all complements. Section 5 concludes. Appendix A contains some technical material while Appendix B contains the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions.
The Model
Consider a composite good (a system) consisting of two components, A and B. The two components are perfect complements and are purchased in a xed proportion (one to one for simplicity).
Initially, we assume that complement A is produced by a monopolist, whereas complement B 8 Gaudet and Salant (1992) study price competition in an industry producing perfect complements and prove that welfare-improving mergers may fail to occur endogenously. Tan and Yuan (2003) consider a market in which two rms sell imperfectly substitutable composite goods consisting of several complementors. They show that rms have the incentive to divest along complementary lines, because the price raise due to competition among producers of complements counters the downward pressure on prices due to Bertrand competition in the market for imperfect substitutes. Alvisi et al. (2011) analyze break-ups of integrated rms in oligopolistic complementary markets when products are vertically dierentiated, focusing in particular on the role of quality leadership. When an integrated rm is the quality leader for all complements, divestitures lower prices, enhancing consumer surplus. When quality leadership is shared among dierent integrated rms, disintegrating them may lead to higher prices, as only in this second case there exists a tragedy of the anticommons. is produced by n oligopolistic rms. 10 Marginal costs are the same for all rms and are normalized to zero.
11 Firms compete by setting prices. We also assume full compatibility among components, meaning that the complement produced by the monopolist in sector A can be purchased by consumers in combination with any of the n versions of complement B. We make this assumption because we are interested in the eect of competition on the pricing strategies of the rms operating in the various complementary markets. If rms could restrict compatibility, competition may be limited endogenously (for instance, the monopolist could allow combination only with a subset of producers in sector B) and the purpose of our analysis would be thwarted. 12
Finally, we assume that the n systems of complementary goods have dierent qualities and that consumers perceive them as imperfect substitutes.
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More specically, the representative consumer has preferences represented by the following utility function, quadratic in the consumption of the n available systems and linear in the consumption of all the other goods (as in Dixit, 1979 , Beggs, 1994 :
where I is the total expenditure on other goods dierent from the n systems, q = [q 11 , q 12 , .., q 1n ]
is the vector of the quantities consumed of each system and q 1j represents the quantity of system 1j, j = 1, .... 
is the price of system 1j (expressed as the sum of the prices of the single components set by rm 1 in sector A and rm j in sector B, respectively) and M is income.
10 We will remove this assumption later and consider a market conguration in which n1 rms produce complement A, whereas n2 rms produce complement B. 13 This implies that the consumption possibility set consists of n imperfectly substitutable systems. Later on, when we consider n1 components in sector A, consumers will have the opportunity to combine each of these components with any of the n2 complements produced in Sector B. We would then have n1 × n2 imperfectly substitutable systems in the market.
14 Note that when referring to a particular system, we use a couple of numbers indicating the two rms in sector A and B, respectively, selling each component of such system. When referring instead to separate components, we use a couple of one letter and one number, the rst indicating the sector (the component) and the second the particular rm selling it. This might appear redundant for A1 when component A is sold by a monopolist, but it will become useful when we introduce competition in sector A.
The rst order condition determining the optimal consumption of system 1k is
Summing (3) over all rms in sector B, we obtain the demand for system 1k
Using (4), we sum the demands of all rms in sector B to obtain the total market size
Following Shubik and Levitan (1980), we set
to prevent changes in γ and n to aect Q, so that, substituting such expression into (5), the normalized market size becomes 
15
Note that component A1 is part of all the n systems, so that (7) also represents the demand function for the monopolist in sector A. Its prot can then be written as
, whereas the prot of a single producer of component B is Π Bk = p Bk · q Bk , where q Bk = q 1k is given in (4). Bertrand equilibrium prices for the monopolist A1 and for the k-th oligopolist are, respectively
where the superscript M stands for monopoly in sector A. Note rst that p M A1 is increasing inᾱ. In fact, A1 is part of all systems, so that an increase in their average quality increases the representative consumer's willingness to pay for them and allows the monopolist to set a higher price p M A1 , which also depends positively on the number n of systems, and on the 15 The second order conditions for the maximization of U (q, I) require γ ≤ β, i.e., γ < 1.
degree of substitutability γ. 16 As we will show below, the increase in competition in the market of the second component (due either to a greater number of rms or to a higher degree of substitutability) reduces oligopolistic prices. Then, as γ or n increases, ceteris paribus, the monopolist in sector A is able to extract a bigger share of consumer surplus setting a higher p M A1 . 17 Not surprisingly, from (9), producers of below-average quality charge lower than average prices (since (α 1k −ᾱ) < 0), whereas the opposite is true for producers of above-average quality.
However, quality premiums and discounts cancel out on average. In fact, the average price in the market for the second component is
Combining (8) and (9), the equilibrium price of system 1k is
so that, the average system price becomes
Finally, using (4), (8) and (9), we derive the equilibrium quantities
We are now ready to compute prots and consumer welfare. Given (8) and (4), the monopolist's prots in sector A are equal to
whereas, after some algebraic manipulation (reported in Appendix A), the k−th oligopolist's prot is
so that aggregate prots in sector B are equal to
represents the variance of the qualities of the n available systems.
Similarly, after some complex algebraic steps illustrated in Appendix A and following Hsu and Wang (2005), consumer surplus can be dened as
where
In the next Section we will compare the equilibrium prices, prots and welfare of our model with those obtained under both an integrated and a complementary monopoly, ceteris paribus.
In this respect, we report here the main tndings in these two alternative regimes.
Particularly, a prot-maximizing integrated monopoly producing both complements would set its system price at
systems, so that prots and consumer surplus would amount to
In a complementary monopoly, two independent rms A1 and B1 produce one component each of the composite good (i.e., n = 1) and, in equilibrium, they set their prices at 
where CS CM < CS IM , obviously.
Competition and Welfare When Sector A is a Monopoly
In this section we verify the impact of changes in the number of rms in Sector B, n, in the degree of substitutability among systems,γ, and in the distribution of the quality parameters (the α 1k 's) on equilibrium prices and welfare.
Along the way, we will verify how the assumption of imperfect substitutability changes the impact of n on the extent of the tragedy of the anticommons when compared to the case studied 
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First of all, comparing prices and quantities when sector A is a monopolist with those obtained in an integrated monopoly, it can be noticed immediately that, when σ 2 α = 0, and α 1k =ᾱ = α IM = α * , k = 1, ..., n, individual component prices in sector B are lower than p IM , while system 18 One should recall that, in their simple model, two rms competing in the market for the second component would be enough to guarantee a surplus equal to that attained in the presence of a single, integrated rm. prices are higher. In fact,
for all γ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, while competition certainly lowers prices in the oligopolistic sector, the monopolist in sector A optimally reacts by extracting more surplus and setting higher prices, so that overall p M 1k > p IM . This has a negative impact on the number of systems sold in the market. In fact, it is immediate to check that Q M = nq M 1k < Q IM . Similarly, when σ 2 α = 0 and the common quality level among all systems coincides with that of a complementary monopoly (again, α 1k =ᾱ = α CM , k = 1, ..., n), component and system prices are lower with competition than with a complementary monopoly (i.e. p M Bk < p B CM and Proof. See Appendix B.
The negative relationship between p M Bk , γ and n is intuitive. The higher the number of rms in sector B and the degree of substitutability among systems, the ercer the competition for the second component and the lower the Bertrand equilibrium prices. Similarly, it is immediate to verify from (10) that the impact of a change in n and γ onp B is the usual and negative one. 19
When checking instead the relationship between n, γ and system prices, we notice from (11) that p M 1k is inuenced by opposite forces. On the one hand, p M A1 increases as either n or γ increase, whereas p M Bk decreases. The following Proposition indicates however that the rst eect is always dominated by the second, so that, overall, p M 1k decreases with n and γ.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium system prices decrease with n and γ. Then, consumer surplus increases with n and γ.
Proof. See Appendix B.
As stated in Lemma 1, when the number of rms in sector B increases, then p M Bk decreases.
The monopolist's best response would be to increase p A1 , given the complementarity between goods A1 and Bk. However, such an increase would negatively aect the demand of all the n systems. Then, the monopolist internalizes such negative externality and limits the increase in 19 p M Bk is also decreasing withᾱ. In fact, it is dened for a given α 1k , so that ifᾱ increases it is because the quality of some systems other than 1k has increased. In such circumstance, the ratio α 1k α actually decreases, reducing the price that rm k can charge. On the other hand, the average pricepB is positively aected byᾱ: as the average quality of the available systems increases, their average price also increases.
p A1 . As a result, the equilibrium system prices decrease with n and the same applies to the degree of substitutability γ.
As for welfare comparisons, we notice rst from (21) 
..., n), consumer surplus with an oligopoly in sector B is always lower than with an integrated monopoly but higher than with a complementary monopoly (CS CM < CS M < CS IM ).
2) if systems dier in quality, consumer surplus is higher with an oligopoly in sector B than with an integrated monopoly if and only if
where σ 2 CS is decreasing in γ and n. If quality variance is suciently high, competition may be preferred even ifᾱ < α IM .
When goods are imperfect substitutes and quality is the same across systems and market structures, then, competition in one sector can certainly improve consumer welfare with respect to a complementary monopoly, but it is never enough to solve the anticommons problem (C S M < CS IM ). 21
Competition can eectively increase consumer surplus above CS IM only if both average quality and variance play a role. Particularly, while it is not surprising that competition increases consumer welfare when it also increases average quality, from (17) it can be veried that quality variance has a positive eect, as well. In other words, our representative consumer benets from variety (varietas delectat). Moreover, both parameters n and γ have a negative eect on σ 2 CS . 20 Our conclusion seem to contradict also the results obtained by McHardy (2006) . In his paper, a very low number of competitors selling imperfect substitutes is sucient to attain the level of social welfare of a complementary monopoly, even if the other sector remains monopolistic.
21 Interestingly this result still holds even if the number of competitors in sector B is endogenized. In the absence of barriers to entry in sector B and for a common quality level (σ 2 α = 0), the equilibrium number of rms will tend to be innitely large. In fact, by Lemma 1, p Bk decreases with n, but it stays above marginal cost. Particularly, using l'Hôpital's Rule, limn→∞p This is because an increase in n and γ decreases equilibrium prices under competition, thus raising consumer surplus, ceteris paribus.
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The results in Proposition 2 are shown graphically in Figure 1 and variance is set suciently high (σ 2 α = 0.37), so that, for n > 4, the representative consumer prefers an oligopoly in sector B to an integrated monopoly. 23
When turning to equilibrium prots and producer surplus in the various market congurations, we establish rst the following results regarding equilibrium quantities. Lemma 2. (a) Q M is increasing in n and γ; (b) q M 1k is decreasing in n, k = 1, ..., n; (c) There existsα 1k <ᾱ, such that q M 1k is increasing in γ for α 1k >α 1k and is decreasing in γ for α 1k <α 1k . Proof. See Appendix B.
As for part (a), note that when n increases, both oligopolistic prices and total system prices in (9) and (11) decrease due to enhanced competition. Moreover, as assumed, such increase in the number of competing rms takes place leaving average qualityᾱ unchanged, so that the dierence α 1k −ᾱ is not aected by the entry of a new available system. Thus, overall, total demand for all systems raise proportionately. However, given that the total market size does not change with n, as implied by the normalization in (6), the increase in the number of available systems will result in a reduction in the demand for each single system. The case in which γ changes is more complex. As γ increases, systems become closer substitutes and their prices decrease (see Lemma 1) . However, this does not necessarily translate into a greater demand for each of them. In fact, as implied by the utility function (1), consumers have a taste for quality so that, ceteris paribus, they prefer systems characterized by a higher α 1k .
Then, as systems become closer substitutes, consumers will demand more high-quality systems at the detriment of low-quality ones. Consequently, the demand for some of the latter ones (those with α 1k <α 1k ) decreases as γ increases. This has immediate repercussions on prots, as we will see below.
The following Corollary and Proposition use Lemmas 1 and 2 to discuss and compare equilibrium prots. 22 Obviously, when αIM >ᾱ, the greater the gap between αIM andᾱ, the greater the valued of σ 2 CS needed to compensate for lower quality. 23 In the simulations presented here, consumer surplus in complementary monopoly, (C SCM ), is always lower than CSM whenever αIM = αCM . This is due to the assumption thatᾱ is only slightly smaller than or equal to αIM . Ifᾱ were smaller enough, we might have CSM < CSCM , at least for low values of γ and n. 
Bk can be increasing with γ. Such possibility also inuences the relationship between γ and Π M B , as the following Proposition shows. Particularly, this is more likely to happen when quality variance is high and then the chance of having rms in sector B with α 1k >α 1k is greater, ceteris paribus.
B is increasing in γ if and only if σ 2 α is suciently high; (c) If
α . Also, for n ≥ 2, P S ≥ Π IM if and only σ 2 α is suciently high. Proof. See Appendix B.
The positive relationship between Π M A1 and n illustrated in Corollary 1 explains why, as indicated in part (a) of Proposition 3, the monopolist's prots are higher when sector B is an oligopoly than when the market is a complementary monopoly. However, whenever γ < 1 the monopolist's prots are always lower than Π IM so that, even an innite number of competitors would not allow the monopolist to obtain the same prots of an integrated monopolist. This is because systems are not perfect substitutes, so that prices in the oligopolistic sector remain, on average, above marginal cost and the negative externality of the tragedy is not fully overcome.
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As for part (b) of Proposition 3, it conrms the previous intuition that industry prots in sector B are increasing with γ when quality variance in suciently high. In such case, the increase in prots of high-quality producers more than compensates the decrease in the prots of low-quality ones.
In the remaining two parts, Proposition 3 compares both industry prots in sector B and producer surplus with their respective values under a complementary and an integrated monopoly. As for producer surplus, results are ambivalent. On the one hand, the idea that postseparation entry of new rms in sector B never solves the tragedy is supported also in terms of the sum of all rms' prots in the economy (so that Π M B + Π M A1 < Π IM ). On the other, we verify that competition in sector B increases the monopolist's prots in sector A in a way that more than compensates the losses in industry prots in sector B, so that overall producer surplus under competition is greater than under a complementary monopoly (Π
Finally, in part (d) we establish that industry prots in sector B can actually be larger than those of an integrated monopolist (and then a fortiori, of a complementary monopolist) when variance is positive. As indicated by equation (16), the higher the quality variance, the larger the value of aggregate prots in sector B, so that it may indeed happen that Π M B ≥ Π IM . Then, for a suciently large value for σ 2 α , producer surplus under competition might also be greater than in an integrated monopoly. 25 In conclusion, quality variance is an indicator of product dierentiation and varietas delectat not only for consumers, but also for sector B as a whole.
Then, joining the results in Propositions 2 and 3, the following Corollary holds when sector B is an oligopoly. α such that total surplus is greater than with an integrated monopoly.
Summing up, consumers are always worse o in a complementary monopoly. Moreover, they might sometimes prefer competition in sector B to an integrated monopoly if quality variance is high. In fact, in such case they would fully enjoy the benets of product dierentation. Similarly, when variance is large enough, producers in sector B might earn greater industry prots than those obtained by an integrated monopolist. In such circumstance, as indicated in proposition 3, some very high-quality rms are able to earn suciently high prots to oset both the low prots of their low-quality competitors and the loss in market power due to competition vis à 25 Note that, for a given average quality, variance is obviously weakly increasing in the number of rms in sector B. In other terms, the higher n, the higher the maximum value that quality variance can take while still satisfying the constraints of the model (that is non-negative prices). This is the reason why this result holds only if n ≥ 3. vis an integrated monopoly. Moerover, when quality variance is high, such possibility is actually favoured by an high degree of substitutability, given that in such instance Π M B increases with γ.
Total surplus follows a similar trend. As long as quality is uniform across systems, the tragedy prevails and competition in sector B is never able to raise social welfare above the corrisponding integrated monopoly level. However, this does not necessary hold with a suciently high product dierentiation, with important implications for antitrust regulation of complementary-good markets. In fact, according to such results the break-up of an integrated rm into independent units producing one component each can be welfare improving if this generates competition for at least one component and if the competing systems in the market exhibit enough quality dierentiation. Note that in Proposition 3 we assumed thatᾱ = α IM = α CM, but our result would be qualitatively the same forᾱ = α IM . Particularly, competition in one sector can still be welfare enhancing even if post-separation entry in such sector reduces average quality, provided a suciently high value for quality variance.
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In the next Section, we extend the model to consider competition in Sector A, too.
Oligopolies in the markets for both complements
In this Section we assume that both complements A and B are produced in oligopolistic markets.
Particularly, component A is produced by n 1 dierent rms, whereas component B is produced by n 2 rms. Again, rms compete by setting prices.
Since consumers can mix and match components at their own convenience, there are n 1 ×n 2 systems in the market and the utility function in (1) becomes
where q ij represents the quantity of system ij, (i = 1, ....., n 1 ; j = 1, ...., n 2 ), obtained by combining q ij units of component A purchased from the ith rm in sector A (component Ai), and q ij units of component B purchased from the jth rm in sector B (component Bj). Also in this case, α ij > 0 (i = 1, ..., n 1 ; j = 1, ..., n 2 ), γ ∈ [0, 1]. The budget constraint now takes the form
is the price of system ij.
The rst order condition determining the optimal consumption of system tk is
26 In this respect, our paper integrates the main conclusion in Economides (1999) , according to which separation of the monopolized production of complementary goods may damage quality.
After some tedious algebra, we obtain the demand function for system tk
where b = β + γ (n 1 n 2 − 2).
As before, to prevent total market size to change with γ, n 1 and n 2 we normalize β as follows 27 β = n 1 n 2 − γ(n 1 n 2 − 1) (26) Given that component At is possibly bought in combination with all n 2 components produced in sector B, total demand and then prots for rm t in sector A are obtained summing q tk in (25) over 
is the average quality of all systems available in the market,ᾱ t = n 2 j=1 α tj n 2 is the average quality of the systems containing component t,
is the average quality of systems containing component k. Parameters A, B, C and D are dened as follows:
Equilibrium quantities are
Note that component At (t = 1, ..., n 1 ) is sold in combination with all its n 2 complements, so that each rm's prots in sector A are equal to
prots from the sale of complement
As for consumer surplus in this n 1 × n 2 model, we adopt the same procedure followed in section 2.2 to obtain
27 Again, the second-order condition requires γ ≤ 1.
is the variance of the systems' quantities sold in equilibrium in the whole market.
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In the remainder of this section we want to investigate the impact that the introduction of competition in sector A has on consumer surplus and on prots, compared to less competitive options, particularly, complementary or integrated monopoly or a situation in which sector A is a monopoly (n 1 = 1). The comparison is rather straightforward when all systems produced in oligopoly have the same quality (so that, by symmetry, V ar(q) = 0). For more general cases, however, the complexity of the expressions for prices, quantities and prots renders the algebraic analysis rather dicult. We will therefore perform numerical simulations.
First, we assume that V ar(q) = 0,
and we establish the following results.
Proposition 4. When both sectors are oligopolies and V ar(q) = 0,
where n * 1 decreases both with n 2 and γ. (c) Oligopolistic prots Π At and Π Bk are always smaller than Π i CM , hence than Π IM . Proof. See Appendix A.
The threshold n * 1 is decreasing in n 2 , indicating quite intuitively that when the number of rms in one of the two sectors is high (and then competition there is particularly aggressive, beneting consumers), the tragedy can be solved also for a relatively low number of rms in the other sector.
29 Moreover, a closer look to the expressions for CS O and CS IM makes us conclude that a competitive industry may be preferred to an integrated monopoly also even when both n 1 and n 2 are relatively low. Particularly, two rms in both sectors may be already enough to solve the tragedy when γ is suciently high, as shown in Figure 2 . Figure 2 is obtained assuming V ar(q) = 0, α * = 1, n 1 = 2 and γ = 0.62. As it can be readily veried, consumer surplus is always higher under competition than in a complementary monopoly. Moreover, it increases with n 1 , lying below CS IM for low n 1 and becoming larger than CS IM for n 1 > 4 (n * 1 = 4.021). Part (b) of the proposition also suggests that the degree of competition required in one sector (say, sector A) to increase consumer surplus above CS IM 28 See Appendix 29 Of course, it would be possible to establish a symmetric threshold for n2, which would then be decreasing in n1.
decreases as either the number of rms in the other sector or the degree of substitutability increase (in fact, n * 1 is decreasing in both n 2 and γ). This happens because an increase in n 2 and/or in γ not only reduces the prices of each single component sold in sector B but also the prices of all systems, thus increasing consumer welfare.
30 Finally, part (c) conrms the relationships among prots found in the n × 1 case, with oligopolists always earning the lowest prots and an integrated monopolist the highest.
If rms produce dierent qualities and V ar(q) > 0, the number of competing rms required to make consumer surplus under competition preferred to that obtained in an integrated monopoly decreases. In fact, a positive V ar(q) increases CS O in (32), thus increasing the range of the parameters for which CS O > CS IM . 31 The exact changes in prices, quantities, prots and welfare as the number of rms and the degree of substitutability between systems vary are analyzed in the following two simulations.
In both, we assume that the two sectors A and B are characterized by dierent quality distributions which get reected on systems' qualities. Specically, in the rst simulation the entry of new rms in one sector allows the composition of ever better systems, so that competition increases average quality in the market. We set α tk (t = 1, ..., n 1 ; k = 1, ..., n 2 ) as follows α 11 = 8 α 12 = 8.5 α 13 = 9 α 14 = 9.5 α 15 = 10
Due to our chosen values, the set of systems {1k} (k = 1, ..., 5) has high average quality than the set {2k} and systems denoted by higher k are better in quality. Table 1 reports equilibrium prices, quantities and welfare when competition increases in sector B. It can be veried that quantity q 11 decreases with n 2 . Moreover, prices in sector A increase with n 2 , whereas prices in sector B decrease. System prices however decrease in n 2 . Unsurprisingly, prices are higher with γ = 0.2 than with γ = 0.62, since competition is ercer in the second case. When γ = 0.2, consumer and producer surplus are higher under integrated monopoly. Things change when γ = 0.62; now ercer competition among closer substitutes leads to substantially lower system prices, thus beneting consumers (for n 2 ≥ 3). This more than compensates for the lower producer surplus, so that total surplus in oligopoly is the highest. Complementary monopoly yields the lowest surplus, both for consumers and producers. Individual prots decrease in sector B as n 2 increases, whereas sector A takes advantage of this by increasing its own prices and prots.
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In the second simulation, we assume that competition worsens average quality in the market, so that, the larger the number of active rms, the lowerᾱ,ᾱ t andᾱ k . Again, with no loss of 30 As we will also see in the simulations below, oligopolists in sector A react to a decrease in the prices in the complementary sector B by increasing their own price. Such increase is however limited, and total system prices overall decrease.
31 Clearly, a fortiori, CSO > CSCM always when quality variance is positive. 32 In Table 1 both consumer surplus and prots under monopolistic congurations increase in n2. This happens because each oligopoly structure (for each n2) is compared with both types of monopoly at the same average quality and here, by assumption,ᾱ increases with n2.
generality, we assume that competition increases in sector B, whereas n 1 = 2 throughout the simulation. To obtain the eect of a decreasing quality level as competition gets ercer, we set α tk (t = 1, ..., n 1 ; k = 1, ..., n 2 ) as follows 33 α 11 = 10 α 12 = 9.5 α 13 = 9 α 14 = 8.5 α 15 = 8 α 21 = 9.5 α 22 = 9 α 23 = 8.5 α 24 = 8 α 25 = 7.5
When γ = 0.2, Table 2 shows that individual rms' and system prices decrease with competition. Interestingly, prices are declining and lower in sector A. This reverts the trend observed in the previous simulation, in which the sector not aected by competition was able to limit the impact or even to take advantage of the increased competition in the complementary sector.
Such change is indeed driven by the decline in quality. Moreover, demand decreases with competition. (in Table 2 we report q 11 ). 34 Even at declining prices and quantities, rms in sector A enjoy however higher prots than rms in sector B and are able to extract a higher surplus than their complementors operating in the more competitive sector. Overall, producer surplus is lower than in an integrated monopoly but higher than in a complementary monopoly. As for consumer surplus, it decreases with competition: lower prices and increased variance are in fact not enough to compensate for the decline in quality. Simmetrically to producer surplus, consumer surplus is highest in integrated monopoly and lowest in complementary monopoly.
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When γ = 0.62, a fth rm in sector 2 obtains no demand because of a too low quality level. This is why the most competitive feasible market structure is at n 2 = 4. System prices and quantities decrease as n 2 increases (and prices are lower than in the γ = 0.2 case, whereas quantities are higher). Interestingly, comparing consumer surplus across market congurations, it can be noticed that CS O < CS IM for n 2 = 2 but CS O > CS IM for n 2 ≥ 3. This happens because the comparison is performed for the same quality level (α IM is set equal toᾱ for each value of n 2 ), but quality variance is increasing. Similarly to the n × 1 case, then, as variance increases, consumer welfare might be greater in competition than with an integrated monopoly.
Finally, although p B1 has the usual pattern (as competition increases in sector B, p B1 decreases), p A1 has a non-monotonic behavior. First, it increases when n 2 increases from n 2 = 2 to n 2 = 3.
When n 2 = 4, however, p A1 gets signicantly lower than before: average quality is getting so low that rms in sector A are forced to reduce their prices. The initial positive relationship with n 2 was caused by the high degree of substitutability γ, that rendered competition especially erce in sector B. When a further increase of n 2 takes quality to very low levels, however, this is not possible anymore. Prots follow the same pattern: they increase in sector A when n 2 goes from 2 to 3 but then decrease. In other terms, the ercer competition due to high substitutability does not allow rms in sector A to counteract the decline in demand due to lower average quality 33 It should be noticed that the coecients α tk are the same as in Simulation 2, but in reversed order. 34 At n2 = 6 the quantity of the lowest quality system becomes negative, implying that increased competition is not sustainable in such market conguration. That's why simulation 2 considers n2 only up to 5. 35 Here consumer surplus and prots under monopolistic congurations decrease in n2 sinceᾱ decreases with higher n2.
with a prot-enhancing price reduction, as it happened when γ = 0.2. As for prots in sector B, they always decrease and so do total prots. However, Π O > Π IM > Π CM because of the high quality variance exogenously produced in the simulation, and this result, combined with the trend observed for consumer surplus, produces an increasing trend for social welfare. In fact, as n 2 increases, total surplus increases as well, surpassing the corresponding integrated monopoly value for n 2 ≥ 3.
Finally, from Table 1 and 2 it is also immediate to check the positive eect that the increase in competition in sector A has on consumer surplus. In fact, no matter the degree of substitutability γ, CS O > CS M . Then, even when either γ or n 2 are low (so that they yield lower consumer surplus than an integrated monopoly) and an integrated monopoly is not a viable solution, introducing some competition in sector A is desirable.
Conclusions
Complementary monopoly is tipically dominated in welfare terms by an integrated monopoly, in which all such complementary goods are oered by a single rm. This is the tragedy of the anticommons. We have considered the possibility of competition in the market for each complement, presenting a model in which n imperfect substitutes for each perfect complement are produced. We have proved that, if at least one complementary good is produced in a monopoly, an integrated monopoly is always welfare superior to a more competitive market setting. Consequently, favoring competition in some sectors, leaving monopolies in others may be detrimental for consumers. Competition may be welfare enhancing if and only if the goods produced by competitors dier in quality, so that also average quality and variance become important factors to consider. We have also proved that, when competition is introduced in each sector, the tragedy may be solved for relatively small numbers of competing rms in each sector if systems are close substitutes, and this even in the limit case of a common quality level across systems. Unsurprisingly, the higher the degree of substitutability and the level of competition in one sector, the more concentrated the other sector can be, while still producing higher consumer surplus than an integrated monopoly.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that quality is costless and exogenously distributed across systems. It would be interesting to extend our model and explicitly consider quality as a costly investment in complementary-good markets. Particularly, a study of the incentives for the monopolist A to discourage innovation and quality improvements in sector B seems a very 
where t =
. Hence
Following Hsu and Wang (2005) , consumer surplus can be written as
whereq = n j=1 q1j n = Q n is average quantity. Using (13), we can writē
and
where A = (n−γ) n(n(3−γ)−2γ) and B = (n−γ) n(1−γ)(2n−γ)
. Also, using (39),
Finally, substituting (38) and (40) into (37), we obtain
A.2
Oligopolistic markets for both complements
It is immediate to obtain the total amount of component At (t = 1, ..., n 1 ) sold in equilibrium if we sum q O tk over the n 2 complements which At is sold with, that is
Similarly,
As for consumer surplus, we generalize Hsu and Wang (2005) and rewrite it as
Using (30), we nd thatq We then check whetherα 1k is a feasible value for an above-average quality. To do that, we compute rst the highest α 1k compatible with a given averageᾱ, α max 1k , which is obtained when the remaining n − 1 rms produce such low-quality systems α min 1s <ᾱ, s = k as to optimally set their price equal to marginal cost (so that they remain active in sector B), that is p , so that CS O > CS IM i either n 1 < n 12 or n 1 > n 11 . It is possible to verify, however, that n 12 < 1 for all γ and n 2 in the admissible range of the parameters. Therefore, CS O ≥ CS IM i n 1 ≥ n 11 and n 11 = n * 1 in (34).
Finally, Dierentiating (34) with respect to γ yields ∂n * 1 ∂γ = − 2(n2−1)n2(1−γ)γ (n2(1−2γ)+γ 2 ) 2 < 0, whereas dierentiating it with respect to n 2 yields Table 2 : Impact of competition when rms are heterogeneous and competition decreases quality.
